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Abstract 
 
In 2009, the IBM T.J Watson Research Center investigated risks that administrators and users 
face while using cloud resources.  In “Managing Security of Virtual Machine Images in a Cloud 
Environment”, they propose a new system called “Mirage”.  This system was developed as a 
template that cloud users could use, to create a robust exploit mitigation system and provided 
security for virtual machines in the cloud.  In this study, we reassess vulnerability assessment in 
the Cloud and develop the opensource “cvaFrame” framework. This framework reports to the 
cloud administrator, vulnerabilities and exploits discovered in virtual images, which are in the 
image repository. Our contribution to the cloud vulnerability assessment research community is 
research specifically targeting dormant public images.  We build our framework on top of 
existing tools like Metasploit and OpenVAS and implement it in an existing cloud service 
“OpenNebula”, to prove that our system works.  We tested our software in a production cloud 
and it was able to find vulnerabilities and exploits hiding in dormant virtual machine images.  At 
this date, we believe we are the first to develop an open-source framework that performs 
vulnerability assessment within the cloud on dormant images. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Companies and users alike continue to transition to cloud system resources.  As more individuals 
migrate to the cloud, more personal data such as bank information, transaction reports, domain 
services, and even full imaged operating systems are increasingly targeted and vulnerable. This 
data is susceptible to attackers if continuous monitoring and maintenance is not conserved.  
Attackers can maliciously hack into a cloud system, steal this data, or even corrupt an entire 
system. This in turn leaves room for improvement in the cloud security model for researchers to 
explore, with hopes to mitigate these attacks. Previous research explains the history of in-house 
developed tools and security teams working non-stop to scan their systems and patch 
vulnerabilities [11].  A few common weaknesses with this system are 
(i) it forces several security officers to work non-stop, 
(ii) the in-house tools that are woven together are not effectively managed and, 
(iii) tools used are not scalable and more importantly are not automated to work as one 
system. 
 In this study, we investigate cloud vulnerabilities and develop a system for security 
administrators to use that will report known vulnerabilities in their cloud system.  Our open 
source CVA-framework is an effective solution because it can be built upon to fit any cloud 
system’s needs.  Inside our framework, we develop several modules that a security administrator 
can choose from.  We designed each module to be automated in order to abstract each module 
configuration.  This approach allows the security manager to interact only with the CVA.  More 
importantly we compile all the data that we have collected from each module and place the 
output in a database that a security administrator can review.   
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To prove that our system works, we have chosen to implement our model in the open 
source cloud data center, OpenNebula Cloud Front End (CFE) [24].  We begin by developing 
two main modules, namely a Metasploit module and an OpenVAS module.  The Metasploit 
module builds directly on top of the Metasploit framework [28] and the OpenVAS module 
similarly is developed on the OpenVAS framework [26]; both are described in more detail in the 
project goals and design subsections.  We then test our modules on the image repository that 
resides in the CFE and report vulnerabilities and exploits.  Later we extend our framework by 
discussing more modules that can be used as a security administrator. 
The following paper is arranged as such: first we present necessary background 
information to the reader assuming little to no prior knowledge on the topic.  We briefly discuss 
what a cloud is, what are vulnerabilities and exploits, vulnerability scanners, security tools, and 
pertinent articles and presentations. We also answer other minor questions such as, “What is the 
difference between hacking and penetration testing?” In the related research section, we take a 
step deeper towards our experiment to explain how to appropriately manage security of virtual 
machine images in a cloud environment.  In our project goals and design section, we briefly 
express our project ideas, and later provide a design model in the experimental design section.  
Next is our methodology, which provides implementation of our framework, and then we 
provide our results and discussion section, which proves that our system works in a real cloud-
computing environment.  We show that this framework can be easily extended upon just as other 
open source frameworks. Last we conclude with our project constraints and future work. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Brief Overview  
 
In order to fully understand vulnerability assessment in the cloud, we must first present a few 
key aspects that tie a threat model in the cloud together.  We first define cloud computing, what a 
cloud is, and the benefits of cloud computing.  We then explain the difference between 
vulnerabilities and exploits, followed by how both of these can elude to other attack vectors such 
as malware, and rootkits.  Next we present vulnerability scanners, and how they can be used to 
mitigate attacks.  Before we begin our literature review we explain the difference between 
hacking and penetration testing. The following sections are then comprised of several academic 
articles and presentations that we felt were necessary to discuss, in order to provide a solid 
foundation on the nature of this topic.  We introduce a simple understanding of cloud 
vulnerabilities, vulnerability assessment scanners, and then the notion of vulnerability 
assessment on the cloud.  Next we discuss an analysis on cloud-based security vulnerability 
assessments, and provide a short list of important security and networking tools.  We finally 
conclude this section by discussing how to conduct a vulnerability assessment, how to migrate 
automatic testing to the cloud, and what vulnerability assessment tools are on the rise. 
2.2 Cloud Computing 
2.2.1 What is cloud computing? 
 
Cloud computing still lacks a clear definition as to what exactly it is, although it has been 
described as a service rather than a product [15]. The CSA Guide defines it as, “a model for 
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enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g. networks, server, storage, applications, and services) [20].”  In history 
we have developed from mainframes to PC’s to client servers and then to web services.  Now we 
have reached this vague idea of a cloud, where users may pay for the resources that sit on the 
cloud.  It essentially is a remote set of resources such as servers that other people connect to in 
order to host their data over the Internet.  The cloud is not just one set of resources that everyone 
around the world uses.  There are many cloud computing data centers with their own physical 
infrastructure, which may or may not benefit different customers.  
2.2.2 Benefits of cloud computing 
 
Some benefits of cloud computing are that anyone can access the cloud from anywhere as long 
as they have a network connection, it is scalable, and you only pay for the resources you use.  All 
three of these benefits focus on easy cheap access to resources.  This means that an individual 
can create an online company, host their data on the cloud resources, and not have to manage 
their own physical infrastructure.   
2.3 Vulnerabilities vs. Exploits 
 
Vulnerabilities and exploits have existed in computer systems since the development of the 
computer.  As new machines and applications are developed, new vulnerabilities and exploits are 
found and patched.  There is a cycle of discovering these holes in programs and creating a 
protection scheme to mitigate being attacked; the Metasploit section summarizes each. 
Vulnerability is “A security flaw or weakness in an application or system that enables an attacker 
to compromise the target system.  A compromised system can result in privilege escalation, 
denial-of-service, unauthorized data access, stolen passwords, and buffer overflows.”  Whereas 
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an Exploit is “A program that takes advantage of a specific vulnerability and provides an attacker 
with access to the target system.”  In short a clear difference between the two is, vulnerability is 
typically a bug in software created by a developer and an exploit typically is an attacker taking 
advantage of that bug [29].  In our investigation, we analyze systems and discover vulnerabilities 
as well as exploits and report to the security administrator what areas need to be patched in order 
to secure each one. 
2.4 What is Malware? 
 
Another major problem with vulnerabilities is that malware can be installed without a user’s 
knowledge.  Malware can be Trojans, viruses, spyware, rootkits, worms or even adware.  Each of 
these types of malware can take advantage of vulnerabilities and result in devastating effects as 
discussed in section 2.3.  A virus requires human interaction; however it can exist inside an 
executable program such as a video game and be run once the video game is started. It will then 
start to spread to other programs and corrupt an entire system.  Worms are similar to viruses, 
however they do not need human interaction to spread.  Trojan horses appear as a useful program 
such as an Internet explorer icon and can also damage a system.  Spyware and rootkits are 
similar in the sense that they watch a user’s interaction while they use their computer and key log 
data such as passwords and other sensitive information.  This logged data is then sent to the 
attacker.  Lastly, adware is usually a program that swindles users by displaying many 
advertisements to them until they purchase an item.  Due to the nature of vulnerabilities and 
exploits carrying payloads, we have investigated a malware scanner as a module in our study, 
which we discuss later in Section 4.3.2.   
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2.5 What is a vulnerability scanner? 
 
A vulnerability scanner is a tool that can scan an entire system for known vulnerabilities.  It 
typically works in conjunction with a database full of known vulnerabilities and cross checks the 
database with any exploits the scanner may find.  The security implications behind using a 
scanner on a system are: 
(i) they provide reports on vulnerabilities found,  
(ii) and can be automated to scan an entire system.   
One of the downsides to automated reports is that sometimes it reports false positives, 
also known as a false alarm. If there are many false alarms, the reliability of the vulnerability 
scanner diminishes, and security administrators must spend many hours checking each false 
positive.  In our study, we use OpenVAS to cross check with reports that other modules produce. 
2.6 Hacking vs. Penetration Testing 
 
One simple difference between hacking and penetration testing is permission.  Sometimes 
penetration testing is also referred to as ethical hacking, however if a user is not granted access to 
test exploits on a system, then they are by default hacking into the system.  In our investigation, 
we use several penetration methods on a production OpenNebula cloud front end.  We believe 
that in order to protect a system against attackers, you must first think as one.  These methods are 
described below in our methodology, section 4.3. 
2.7 Understanding Cloud Computing Vulnerabilities 
As stated in the introduction, cloud computing introduces the idea of many virtual machines on a 
single physical infrastructure.  “Understanding Cloud Computing Vulnerabilities” contained a 
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detailed description of the difficulties faced when dealing with cloud security rather than the 
security of a single machine [5].  These difficulties are known as Control Challenges.  In other 
words, there are instances where security is more difficult to maintain once the unique attributes 
of a cloud are combined with more traditional security issues.  A description of generic cloud 
infrastructure is presented, as it is a primary basis of the entire paper.  The authors discussed 
many related topics, including the importance of determining the benefits and risks of cloud 
infrastructure in regards to security.  The cloud is simply an environment in which the user is 
given specific privileges.  The probability and implications of a user obtaining access without 
permission, is a crucial point of discussion when designing how to best defend the cloud.  In 
addition, cloud-specific vulnerabilities are discussed as well as their possible solutions.  Specific 
attacks are also discussed, including session riding attacks, virtual machine escape, and 
exploiting deprecated cryptography.  This report concludes with the idea that since it is not 
possible to fully protect certain aspects of the cloud, perhaps adding a vulnerability assessment 
tool to the cloud infrastructure is both viable and necessary. 
2.8 Vulnerability Assessment Scanners 
Vulnerability assessment scanners are tools that scan networks and provide a diagnostic report 
on discovered vulnerabilities.  The scanner cross checks with a database of known common 
security holes and tries to exploit them.  Any detected security holes are classified, and 
mentioned to the administrator along with a set of recommendations that they should take to 
improve the security of their network.  Chicago lab researchers in their investigation tested the 
top vulnerability scanners designed to test networks [6].  They tested Axent Technologies' 
NetRecon, BindView Corp.'s HackerShield, eEye Digital Security's Retina, Internet Security 
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Systems' Internet Scanner, Network Associates' CyberCop Scanner, and two open-source 
products: Nessus Security Scanner and Security Administrator's Research Assistant (SARA) on 
five platforms (Hewlett-Packard Co. HP-UX, Microsoft Windows NT, Novell NetWare, Red Hat 
Linux and Sun Microsystems Solaris).  In their study, they tested these scanners with seventeen 
of the top known vulnerabilities and report that none of the tested scanners found all seventeen 
vulnerabilities.  One interesting point made in this article described the notion of the ‘Numbers 
Game’. They argue that a numbers game is not an accurate argument to determine what scanner 
is best. For example one scanner may have scanned the fastest, whereas another may have 
scanned slower and found more vulnerabilities. Or there were instances when one scanner 
scanned significantly more files than another scanner, but found fewer vulnerabilities.  They 
conclude by proposing an ideal vulnerability scanner with a few key features.  The database 
filled with vulnerabilities must remain up-to-date and accurate, it must be limited to the amount 
of false positives, and it should also store multiple scans for performance trends along with an 
easy method to fix discovered problems.  
2.9 Vulnerability Scanning and Cloud Computing 
The Internet has rapidly become vital to international commerce, and with commerce comes 
those who would attempt to exploit it.  The importance of cyber security for businesses is 
increasing as companies and consumers increasingly rely on the Internet.  Without secure 
servers, web applications, and infrastructure, businesses cannot expect to effectively secure their 
data.  Scanning their resources is mandatory to stay ahead of potential attackers, but utilizing the 
cloud security presents a challenge to this necessity.  In many cases, it is far more efficient for 
companies to utilize online resources rather than spend money bolstering and protecting their 
15 
 
own physical infrastructure.  The problem is that although this service is very cost-effective, it 
comes with increased risk, because the companies can no longer manage their own security.  
This problem stems from the difficulty of differentiating between companies assessing their own 
resource vulnerability, and attackers attempting to breach security in order to steal information.  
Therefore, it is necessary for cloud administrators to provide a service to scan and test the 
resources of their clients for the benefit of both, despite the load on the cloud to perform the 
service.  When discussing this topic the author, Craig Balding of CloudSecurity, suggests 
“Something like a ‘ScanAuth’ API call offered by cloud providers that a customer can call with 
parameters for conveying source IP address(es) that will perform the scanning, and optionally a 
subset of their Cloud hosted IP addresses, scan start time and/or duration [16].” 
2.10 Vulnerability Assessment with Application Security 
Web security is a quickly evolving subject because the web environment is constantly shifting 
with the introduction of new services.  While the web offers an easier interface for consumers 
and companies, it also amplifies the potential for vulnerability exploit attacks. The dynamics of 
attacks over the web is morphing from a small number of targeted attacks on large institutions to 
many smaller attacks on a variety of smaller targets [8].  This change has caught many small 
companies and private individuals off guard, because they operated on the assumption that 
attacks on their resources were less likely.  An increasing number of companies have started to 
protect themselves against this threat.  In light of this, Geelan, et al. discussed the steps that 
smaller companies are taking in order to protect their assets.  When discussing this topic, they 
emphasized that no security is perfect because the environment is constantly changing.  They 
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argue that best protection is achieved by integrating multiple vulnerability scanners and exploit 
programs to get the best of each and therefore deter future attacks. 
2.11 Vulnerability Assessment Through the Cloud: A Case Study 
The chief information security officer at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
released a presentation, which focused on the cloud vulnerabilities that the OCC faces.  The 
OCC contains extensive amounts of personal and uniquely identifiable information, which 
attackers try to steal [11].  Some of the types of attacks he reveals in his presentation are socially 
engineered e-mails, forged documents, or even SQL injections.  Most of the vulnerabilities exist 
because of human error or other flaws that disregard the engineering code of ethics 
documentation.   The OCC is just one of many major organizations that rely on cloud resources 
to maintain their data.  Before cloud vulnerability assessment tools, administrators had to 
develop in-house systems that integrate several tools and forced several engineers to work full 
time managing their services. Now with vulnerabilities as a service (VaaS), these in-house 
systems are growing obsolete, especially if cloud-providing organizations want to compete with 
other cloud providers who have VaaS. 
2.12 Analysis on Cloud-Based Security Vulnerability Assessment 
Many different methods of cloud vulnerability assessment have been developed.  In “Analysis on 
Cloud-Based Security Vulnerability Assessment” the authors focused on presenting a few of 
these methods, as well as drawing comparisons between them [10].  The key point was the 
authors’ contention of having the target and the vulnerability assessment tool on the same 
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hardware.  A much more complete scan can be taken, giving the owner the best possible 
assessment of risk to their cloud resources. 
2.13 SecTools.Org: Top 125 Network Security Tools 
SecTools is an organization, which monitors the security community, seeking out the best tools 
[23].  They regularly compile and update a list of the tools as well as foster the development of 
their own open-source projects.  They provide links to other communities as well.  The website 
features a host of different types of tools, many of which were related to our project goals. 
2.13.1 Antimalware 
Antimalware tools are specifically designed to detect and remove harmful viruses and Trojans 
from infected machines.  Additionally, they help prevent machines from becoming infected by 
other malware as seen in section 2.4.  Malware is used to either steal personal information from 
the owner or to take control of certain aspects of the machine and utilize the resources. 
2.13.2 Rootkit detectors 
Rootkit detectors are designed to find rootkits, which are programs, which by nature hide 
themselves from the operating system and by extension the user.  Rootkits can intentionally 
leave openings through which malware can enter and corrupt the machine. 
2.13.3 Vulnerability exploitation tools 
Vulnerability exploitation tools are made to systematically seek out and attack vulnerabilities on 
a target machine.  This means they will attempt to use potential vulnerabilities to take control of 
a machine and give control to an attacker. 
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2.13.4 Vulnerability scanners 
Vulnerability scanners search machines for potentially harmful vulnerabilities where an attacker 
or program could potentially attack and exploit the machine.  They are designed to alert the user 
as to where they need to patch in order to best protect their resources. 
2.14 Migrating Automatic Self-Testing To the Cloud 
The focus of this paper is to discuss the possibility of migrating the testing of personal resources 
to the cloud.  Users are unable to assess their own resources because the host cannot ascertain 
whether the penetration testing and vulnerability scans are benign self-tests or intrusion attempts 
by an attacker[17].  For this reason, many cloud providers specifically ban any security 
assessment upon cloud resources by their owners.  This is in neither party’s best interest because 
both the end user and the cloud providers are more at risk in the long run.  The only way to get 
around this issue is to move testing within the cloud infrastructure, which also makes it far more 
effective because access is easy.  This paper goes on to discuss a specific design for 
implementing this type of cloud security using an automated system.  In particular, it is noted 
that since the risk assessment of cloud images is only one at a time, the idea is practical because 
it will not require too many resources. 
2.15 Vulnerability-assessment services on the rise 
As cloud-computing demands have increased, security implications are now more vital than ever.  
New tools such as scanners are used to take an automated analytical approach that can determine 
that vulnerabilities not only exist, but also can effectively correct security flaws [4]. A few tools 
some online companies are using are Nessus, OpenVAS, Nexpose, or other vulnerability 
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scanning tools.  These scanners over the years have developed from unreliable tools that reported 
false positives, lacked scalability, and other bugs that prevented the tools from effectively 
scanning the network for vulnerabilities.  For example, they did not provide detailed information 
or control services. These major vulnerability assessment tools, despite their flaws, have 
provided an impetus for the development of new tools. 
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3 Related Research 
3.1 CSAGUIDE 
 
The Cloud Security Alliance provides extensive recommendations on reducing risk in cloud 
computing. The image below illustrates the differences between IaaS, cloud software, PaaS and 
software as a service [20]. 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1 
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3.1.1 Interoperability and Portability  
 
Interoperability and portability allow for rapid expansion of computing resources, because cloud 
services can quickly be purchased and appear to the user as a seamless part of a local computer 
infrastructure.  Unfortunately, it is not identical in the sense that security is far harder to manage.  
To make the system seem unified, data must be transferred constantly to and from the local 
infrastructure as well as the cloud service.  Fortunately these concepts are not new, having 
existed before cloud computing.  However, without these two attributes, the cloud would never 
be a viable or useful idea. 
3.1.2 Virtualization 
 
Virtualization is vital to Infrastructure, Platform and Software-as-a-Service.  Computing 
resources are most efficiently used when you can utilize multi-tenancy and operating with a 
common data center.  However, many concerns are brought about when using VM’s in addition 
to questions about the amount of resources it would take to properly monitor them.  Using VM’s 
create inter-VM attacks, guest users, and many more potential threats to the overall system.  The 
shared data center is also more at risk along with the challenge of encrypting VM’s in order to 
protect them when they are dormant within the image repository. 
3.1.3 Security for Cloud Computing 
 
Maintaining security within a cloud environment is very similar to managing more traditional 
security risks.  However, the cloud’s structure and underlying technology adds certain new 
elements of risk.  To assess these risks, the authors of the CSA guide also note that there are four 
significant factors to note.  Firstly, the resources, assets, and information must be taken into 
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account.  It is important to know how they are being managed within the cloud.  Another key 
question that needs to be considered is, “Who is managing the resources and how are they doing 
it?”  Also, what security controls are there and how are they built into the system?  It is important 
to figure this out quickly because this is the only way to differentiate whether the administrator 
or user is responsible for each security risk.  Cloud users must be aware of what security risks are 
handled for them by their service provider in order to know which security precautions they must 
take to protect their assets. 
3.1.4 Security as a Service 
 
Security as a service is a potential way to secure the cloud resources.  The idea is that there will 
be a central framework, which is designed to scan cloud resources and report back to the owners 
of these resources automatically.  It is a service because the cloud administrators cannot 
differentiate between a user testing their own security and an attacker, and therefore must 
provide it as an internal service.  Otherwise, there is no feasible way for a customer to know if 
their resources are secure, and the entire cloud is more likely to become compromised.   In the 
CSA guide, the authors detail how this must be included in the contract between the service 
providers and the users. 
3.1.5 Information Management and Data Security 
 
The cloud environment is constantly changing, with new VM’s and servers starting and stopping 
continuously.  This makes data management a bit more complicated than when it was managed 
in static, non-virtualized resources.  To adapt to this new environment, a Data Security Lifecycle 
is recommended.  This lifecycle starts with the creation of any data.  Once created, the data must 
be stored somewhere, possibly in some format for security purposes.  Afterwards, someone can 
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access that data in order to use it.  One of the possible uses is to then share that data with 
someone else, or with another computing resource.  In addition, data can be archived for longer-
term storage.  Eventually, data will be destroyed either by digital or physical means.  This 
lifecycle is not always completely used, as a file in not always used, or archived, or even 
destroyed for the purposes of examining data security in a cloud. 
 During this lifecycle, many factors must be accounted for by an organization’s security 
administrator in order to maintain data security.  It is important to classify all information to 
something like “trade secret” or “low priority”, so that it is easy to monitor it all.  Then, policies 
for each classification must be put in place to keep data secure.  This has to take into account 
location.  Limiting authorization to access data is important to restrict how many people can pose 
a risk to the data.  Finally, ownership of the data and who is designated to manage it also needs 
to be accounted for. 
3.1.6 Application Security 
 
The size, variability and interactivity of a cloud challenge traditional notions about application 
security.  The authors note that cloud applications need a similar level of security to those 
connected directly to the Internet because they are far more exposed than they would be in a 
stand alone system. Much like data security within the cloud, there is a life cycle, the Software 
Development Life Cycle that should be understood before designing an application for, or using 
an application on, the cloud.  This life cycle details how an application should be protected as 
well as the states an application can enter.  The developer must examine these states to account 
for possible security issues which may arise in each. 
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3.1.7 Application Penetration Testing for the Cloud 
 
Within a cloud computing system, there can be many active VM’s at once.  Each of these VM’s 
can have many different applications running which all may have vulnerabilities.  Therefore, 
doing penetration testing on these applications is vital to cloud security.  The testing would 
probably not be application specific and treat applications as a “black box”, meaning that the 
penetration tester would be looking for more general and common programming mistakes which 
led to vulnerabilities.  Other kinds of testing, which could potentially be run, are tests such as 
denial of service attacks, to see if the application is vulnerable to it.  It is imperative to keep in 
mind that the attacker could be either inside or outside the cloud in order to best protect and 
assess the application. 
3.2 A New Middleware Service for Making Grids Interoperable 
Metabrokering is a method for managing grid infrastructure as well as making the grid 
interoperable.  Researchers at SZTAKI developed this system in order to allow grid computing 
to move beyond the realm of research and into the commercial market.  The idea behind grid 
computing is not new.  Shared infrastructure was the method by which universities provided 
computing services starting in the 1960’s until the microprocessor became cheap enough for 
personal computers.  The idea was to provide computing as a service to a large group of users.  
This idea came about from the realization that a group of users uses a considerably more 
powerful computational resource far more efficiently than a single user with a personal machine 
[7]. The research topic of “A New Middleware Service for Making Grids Interoperable” was 
primarily to investigate and propose a new method to make grids interoperable rather than 
isolated [9].  The main challenge for researchers is that unlike single computers, each grid 
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infrastructure is generally a unique and complex set of computing resources.  Since each grid 
contains a large, yet different set of resources, each grid also provides a corresponding set of 
services to their customers.  If one grid can support many different users at once with a certain 
number of services and a certain degree of quality, it follows that two interoperable grids could 
provide an even better service to the users of both grids. 
The most relevant issue discussed by the authors was the design of grids in general.  The 
grid distinctly separates the user from the hardware, meaning that they will be fully unaware of 
how the grid is working, while fully understanding how to use the grid.  This creates many new 
security issues, which the cloud administrator must deal with because the user no longer has the 
ability to manage their own security. This ties in well with OpenNebula, where in a similar 
fashion, the user does not need to know how the cloud operates, only understand how to utilize 
it. 
3.3 OpenNebula 
OpenNebula is open-source software designed to allow data center virtualization on local 
infrastructure [24].  A virtualized data center is essentially a collection of virtual resources.  
These resources can be used in order to store or process data using virtual machines and servers.  
It is designed to be interoperable, allowing it to communicate easily with other clouds.  In 
addition, OpenNebula was designed with adaptability in mind, meaning it assimilates well with 
almost all local infrastructures.  OpenNebula is designed to run as quickly and reliably as 
possible, with every type of virtual machine it supports, running any Operating System, whereas 
commercial cloud management systems are more inclined to favor one.  As long as the hardware 
is robust enough to run a data center, OpenNebula will serve that purpose well. 
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 OpenNebula is exceedingly popular in research areas because unlike commercially built 
systems, the code is open source, allowing researchers to pioneer new features and 
implementations [25].  They can also tweak OpenNebula in order to customize it to their 
research goals.  OpenNebula’s flexibility has motivated SZTAKI to run their datacenter in their 
experimental cloud.  Implementing our new modules is fairly easy considering the overall size of 
the program.  While OpenNebula is popular in research, it is also applied commercially because 
it is overall a very robust piece of software. 
 There are many benefits of using OpenNebula [24].  OpenNebula is capable of adding 
new hardware hosts to the cloud only when needed, can support local or remote cloud resources, 
and administrators can control all of the infrastructure from a centralized manager.  This means 
the user has a very flexible environment in which to work.  OpenNebula allows the user to run 
multiple machines with different and even incompatible required software, all while using the 
same shared hardware. 
 Our work is designed to be flexible, meaning when we apply it to OpenNebula, it will 
appear to the cloud administrator as part of the cloud front end.  This way, the administrator can 
easily run each different security tool from the cloud front end, using CVA commands.  Our 
work is not designed specifically with OpenNebula in mind, although we tested our CVA tool 
with this specific cloud infrastructure, as seen in section 4.4. 
3.4 Managing Security of Virtual Machine Images in a Cloud Environment 
 
Researchers from the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center investigated how to securely manage 
virtual machine images (VMimages) in the cloud [18]. They propose an image management 
system that incorporates several features such as filtering, scanning, user validation, and security 
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flaw repairs. They conclude by arguing that their “Mirage” system improves scalability and out-
performs traditional vulnerability assessment tools in the cloud. Their research has provided a 
great foundation for further research in the cloud because they look at a variety of attack vectors.  
Due to the generality of their system to be implemented in any cloud system, they make some 
assumptions that will not function with every cloud system; these assumptions and 
implementation details will be flushed out in the following sections. For this reason, we have 
used the knowledge presented in their research and developed our own model that will provide 
vulnerability assessment in the cloud and aim to implement the system. 
There are two key points that we took into consideration while developing our system. In 
VMimages, there must be high integrity and security because they determine the initial states of 
running images.  The other key point made is that there are VMimages that are shared among 
unrelated users.  For example, a user given named ‘x1’ may start an image provided by user ‘x0’.  
User ‘x0’ may have initially created this image for malicious reasons such as leaving viruses that 
could access the host machine, embedding rootkits that could steal your personal login 
credentials, or any other type of surreptitious acts.  Due to the nature of images on the cloud, any 
user can access publicly provided images to reap the benefits of the available resources, or face 
the consequences of there being a lack of security.  By having a foundation of security within 
each of the virtual machine images, it improves protection of customer privacy and sensitive data 
by improving the security of the host machines. 
Some security angles that can be looked at as described in this research are, publisher 
risks, customer risks, and administrator risks. The publisher is a user that creates a VMimage and 
posts it to the cloud, the customer accesses public images, and the administrator manages the 
security of the images hosted in their cloud.  The publisher is concerned with confidentiality, the 
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customer faces safety or leakage problems, and the administrator tries to mitigate malware. The 
VMimages can have fully configured applications that affect all three types of users.  For 
example, a publisher may have publicly published an image that has all of their bank information 
stored in their web browser.   Later, an attacker, disguised as a customer, may visit that 
VMimage and access that personal information.  Or another example is if an attacker disguised 
as a publisher posts an image with malware and rootkits, and a customer accesses an image they 
believe to be secure.  Once the customer accesses that image, the attacker sees all of their 
keystrokes and actions.  The IBM research team provides another probable example claiming 
that dormant images may have exploits that remain unpatched well after the exploit has been 
found.  An attacker may later gain access into VMimage by exploiting a dormant vulnerability. 
Although their proposed system “Mirage” does not provide complete security for images 
in the cloud, it does include several areas that must be looked at in developing an exploit 
mitigation system.  We do not go into depth on any of their key features, however we do list 
them and briefly explain them.  The first is that there must be access control that allows a user to 
share images.  By having user identity authentication, images could be private, public, or 
protected images, which only grant access to those correct users.  This can help protect 
customers from accidentally seeing other unrelated customers’ information.  Next, there must be 
filters that can automatically either hide or simply remove a user’s personal data in an image.  
Next, there must be a regulation system that allows a user to upload or instantiate images.  This 
could flag users who have previous history of posting malicious images, or keep records of who 
previously accessed an image and checked it in with malicious changes.  The next feature is an 
image filter at publish and retrieval time that could scan an image for vulnerabilities and provide 
data to an administrator or publisher about the image.  If the image has vulnerabilities, the 
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system could prevent the user from uploading or instantiating the image.  The last key feature 
would be a set of repository maintenance services that automatically update and patch images as 
exploits are discovered as well as scan for malware. 
These general ideas are a great starting point in developing a vulnerability assessment 
tool. They even provide benchmarks against a scanner clamAV, however we feel that this 
generalized cloud tool also includes assumptions that “Mirage” will work for every cloud service 
[19].  To remove generalities in this investigation, we have chosen a specific cloud system, 
OpenNebula. In section 3.2, we described the foundation of OpenNebula, metabrokering as a 
system, and in the following section we describe the implementation of our framework, namely 
Cloud Vulnerability Assessment (CVA). 
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4 Project Goals and Design 
“If I had eight hours to chop down a tree, I’d spend the first six of them sharpening my axe.” – Abraham 
Lincoln 
4.1 Assumptions 
 
The Cloud Vulnerability Assessment Tool operates upon several assumptions.  First, the tool was 
designed specifically for OpenNebula in order to work within the existing cloud framework.  
However, the tool’s CVA uses EC2 commands, meaning that the tool can be used with any cloud 
that supports the EC2 interface.  This means that we assume the user has an EC2 account in 
order to use the commands.  Our tool assumes several dependencies are met.   Currently our tool 
works within the cloud front end.  Also, our modules tool were developed and tested on 
Backtrack 5 R2, which is discussed in section 4.3.4.  With the download, Backtrack OS contains 
both OpenVAS, discussed in section 4.3.2, and Metasploit, discussed in section 4.3.1.  These two 
tools are absolutely necessary to operate the CVA.  Therefore we assume that all dependencies 
are installed correctly.  It is important that the security manager receives a report instantly via e-
mail, therefore there must also be a mail server properly configured.  In addition, we assume 
there is a properly installed persistent MySQL database to connect to on the cloud.  In our 
methodology, we use a MySQL database, which will later be discussed in section 4.3.3.  The 
final assumption is the existence of an image repository with images for the tool to scan. 
4.2 Experimental Design 
4.2.1 Prerequisites 
 
We have developed a framework to automate our vulnerability assessment in the cloud.  In figure 
4.2.1, the diagram provides an abstract implementation of our framework.  In this section, we 
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discuss the design of our Cloud Vulnerability Assessment framework. We have created a special 
user “SecurityAdmin” that has specific key pair encryption keys. The SecurityAdmin’s public 
key is then placed into the module virtual machine, which allows the user to run a module from 
the Cloud Front End without user authentication.  The Security manager also has special EC2 
account credentials to run EC2 OpenNebula commands [31].    
4.2.2 Cloud Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) 
 
To start our framework, a SecurityAdmin only needs to specify a target address, which we pull 
from the instantiations of the images loaded, and at most, one other argument depending on the 
implementation on the different modules. Once the SecurityAdmin starts the framework, it first 
prompts the SecurityAdmin for a module to run as well as an image id of the module virtual 
machine. It then scans an image repository for all available targets and creates a list of target 
images.  The next step is to load the module virtual machine and target machine ‘y’ to test.  By 
having the public keys in the module VM, the SecurityAdmin has permission to send commands 
over the SSH tunnel. Once the target and module machines are running, the module begins 
scanning the IP address of the target machine with the specified module.  After the module has 
completed its test, it dumps the data to a reported image storage virtual machine, and starts the 
next module on target machine ‘y’. After each module on target ‘y’ has completed, target ‘y’ is 
subsequently shutdown, and the CVA framework loads target ‘y + 1’ for testing.  The benefit of 
sending the vulnerability assessment output to a shared location, is that the information can be 
collaborated with other modules.  This is later described in section 4.3.3 of the methodology 
section.  It is important to mention that we heavily rely on a system like OpenNebula to develop 
and test our experimental design in order to produce real results from our implementation.   
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Figure 4.2.1 
4.3 Methodology 
 
Our experimental design let our modules in the cloud be very independent and flexible, meaning 
that we could choose essentially any combination of tools.  Therefore, we were able to focus 
research on which tools were able to best maintain the security of images in the cloud rather than 
meet design constraints.  Our primary objective was to include as many different tools as we 
could with the time allotted. Our goal was to discover different tools to evaluate in four separate 
categories, exploit tools, vulnerability assessment scanners, malware detectors and rootkit 
detectors.  In the interest of implementing the best overall tool in the time available, we chose to 
determine the best exploit tool and vulnerability assessment scanner available.  With the 
remaining time, we considered implementing the two other additional modules, namely malware 
and rootkit detectors.  The Cloud Vulnerability Assessment tool and Reported Information 
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Storage VM were vital parts of the overall tool, leading us to allocate time specifically for their 
implementation as soon as the final design was set. 
We selected Metasploit as our exploit tool.  From our research, we determined that 
Metasploit was our best option, as penetration testers often use it for launching attacks.  
Metasploit exploits virtual machines within OpenNebula to best ensure they are secure from a 
wide variety of penetration attacks.  This tool offered a wide array of functionality including 
scans to detect known vulnerabilities and various exploits to run on the target machine based 
upon the scan.  We also chose OpenVAS in order to perform vulnerability assessment scans.  
There were many different types of vulnerability scanners available, but only a few were open 
source.  We looked specifically at OpenVAS, but also considered NeXpose, an alternative 
vulnerability scanner. OpenVAS had an entirely separate development community from 
Metasploit and NeXpose, therefore utilizing it alongside Metasploit would result in the most 
ubiquitous results given two tools. 
After selecting Metasploit and OpenVAS, we designed the framework as well as the 
necessary components as depicted in figure 4.2.1.  The framework had to be modular, so that it 
could accommodate different types of tools and run them without conflicting with one another.  
Deciding how the framework would operate involved learning about the design of OpenNebula, 
which was one of the few constraints that we had to accommodate for.  We determined that a 
virtual machine within the cloud was the best place to store and run our modules because our 
tools would have the most direct access to each target virtual machine.  Due to this design 
choice, selecting an operating system on which to run our tool was necessary.  Several different 
operating systems were considered, including a long-term support (LTS) version of Ubuntu 
Server and Backtrack OS.  After considering both options, we chose Backtrack due to several 
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advantages it possessed.  Backtrack is a Linux distribution specifically designed for security 
evaluation and comes with many different tools, including Metasploit and OpenVAS already 
installed.  We will discuss Backtrack in further detail in section 4.3.4. 
 After running Metasploit and OpenVAS, reports are generated from the scans.  The 
reports from these tools contain information from Metasploit about possible exploits and 
OpenVAS’s potential vulnerabilities discovered. 
A database was an ideal solution for storing the generated information.  We decided that 
it was best to parse the information to eliminate useless text and consolidate the important 
results. MySQL was chosen primarily because of our team’s prior knowledge of the syntax and 
language with regards to both building and using MySQL databases.  Utilizing a database has the 
main advantage of allowing a user to query for reports on specific images within the cloud image 
repository, or by other useful sorting parameters.  We will go into more detail about the database 
later in the Reported Information Storage VM, section 4.3.3. 
4.3.1 Metasploit 
 
Although Metasploit may appear as just a hacker tool, it is well recognized as an open source 
auditing tool that allows penetration testers to gather network information and test vulnerabilities 
in their network.  One of the benefits of Metasploit is having penetration tools that quickly find 
targets and attack.  Delving inside the entire Metasploit framework is out of the scope of this 
paper, however we will lightly gloss over its capabilities and go into detail about which aspects 
of Metaspoit we integrated into our system.  Metasploit can gather information by port scanning, 
handle password sniffing, SNMP sweeps[3] that detail system specific information, consolidate 
gathered information in the Dradis framework[35], and even allows users to create their own 
scanners.  Metasploit can do vulnerability scanning SMB login checks[2] that tell an attacker 
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where other valid passwords can be used, check for default passwords on VNC or Open_X11 
servers, active WMAP web application scanning, and include vulnerability scans from third 
party frameworks like NeXpose[34] and Nessus[22]. The Metasploit framework can test for 
TFTP and IMAP fuzzers[32] against SQL Injection attacks, XSS, buffer overflows, and even 
directory traversal attacks.  Metasploit includes documentation to easily extend the framework 
and create new exploits with useful API calls.  These attacks along with many other client side 
exploits such as binary payloads, antivirus bypassers, java applet infections, or binary linux 
Trojans, are all available to a penetration tester.  Once a tester has successfully opened a session 
from an exploit, they have more tools available to them that create privilege escalations, can 
screen capture sessions, packet sniff, create backdoors for re-explotation, and pivot to other 
machines in the network.  Even more, Metasploit has extended usage that allows a user to 
automate browser attacks and target an untraditionally new operating system, MacOS X.  
Beyond there is more third party software such as Armitage [13] which provides a graphical user 
interface(GUI) for the Metasploit framework. This GUI is an alternative to the Metasploit 
msfconsole, or msfcli interfaces. 
 In previous versions of Metasploit, a service called db_autopwn existed, which 
automated the technical process of getting Metasploit working for attackers.  The developers of 
Metasploit felt that the service did not belong in the core because it could launch many exploits 
at one target concurrently and crash them, instead of launching controlled attacks [12]. This 
service was the same module that fastrack, an extension of Metasploit used to automate 
penetration testing.  This service has been removed from the latest versions of Metasploit as well 
as Backtrack 5 R1 and versions following.  Metasploit developers claim that in the future, this 
automation process will be cleaner, well maintained and re-implemented back into the MSF core.  
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Due to this depreciation, we have used the Metasploit framework to develop our own module 
that incorporates the Metasploit framework service as a prototype until a new revision of the 
db_autopwn is developed and can be integrated into the CVA framework. Our framework uses 
the db_autopwn functionality provided as a upgraded plugin to the metasploit framework, 
maintained and provided by a user at github [14].  
 In figure 4.3.1, the Metasploit Module Diagram illustrates the design of the Metasploit 
Module that can be called from the CVA framework.  In algorithm “sploit.py”, it provides the 
implementation of the sploit module. The overall scheme of the module gathers information 
based upon the target address specified in the pullExploit() function, then tests the vulnerabilities 
in the testExploit() function, and last sends the information to the reported storage information 
virtual machine. The core of the module in the pullExploits() function first creates a resource file 
to pass to the msfconsole, to delete all previous host information.  It then scans the target address 
to discover the operating system, and stores this computer information in the metasploit 
database.  Next it runs the db_autopwn plugin to attempt to exploit the target by testing the 
machine against numerous known exploits that match the target’s gathered information.  The 
second time, a resource file is passed to the msfconsole in the testExploit() function. It uses the 
information stored from the db_autopwn to display the exploits that correlate with that target 
virtual machine.   The sploit tool automates through each exploit that matches that target 
operating system, and will continue the same process for each target instance that is passed to the 
sploit module from the CVA framework.  Once the tool has tested each exploit on a target, it will 
pass the output from the tool to the reported image storage virtual machine through a secure 
tunnel enabled by the key pair encryption keys.  
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 To test this sploit module, Rapid7 has developed a  “metasploitable” virtual machine that 
has several vulnerabilities [1].  We used this virtual image to test finding vulnerabilities and 
exploiting them.  We opened sessions with each successful exploit and gracefully closed them.  
We verified each exploit against the known exploits in the provided metasploitable virtual image.  
To extend our testing of the sploit module, we tested this module on the cloud images, by 
creating instantiations of each public image and running the tool against different operating 
system types.   
 
Figure 4.3.1 
 
 
38 
 
4.3.2 OpenVAS 
 
OpenVAS is a versatile and powerful vulnerability scanner [27].  The tool was originally 
designed as an open-source vulnerability assessment tool called Nessus.  At one point, Nessus no 
longer remained open-source at which point OpenVAS diverged from it in order to remain open 
source.  OpenVAS has highly customizable scans, but comes with a set of preconfigured scans, 
which are adequate for most purposes.  The version of OpenVAS used in our project is 
OpenVAS 4, as it is the latest stable release at this time.  OpenVAS has many different modules, 
which work in conjunction to scan target machines.  
OpenVAS [26] 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1 
 
First there is the OpenVAS Scanner, which actually performs the scans.  This scanner 
relies on Network Vulnerability Tests (NVT), or plugins.  These plugins are loaded each time the 
scanner module is started.  OpenVAS remains up to date via these plugins, each of which help 
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define how scans are performed.  The scanner is capable of scanning just one target or entire IP 
ranges at once.  The OpenVAS manager sits atop the scanner in the framework.  The manager is 
more or less a black box module, which the user usually does not need to understand but does 
need to know how to use.  The manager handles omp from the OpenVAS CLI as well as direct 
XML commands from all three of the available clients, the OpenVAS CLI, the Greenbone 
Security Assistant, and the Greenbone Security Desktop.  The manager is the difference between 
a vulnerability scanner and a vulnerability manager because it adds both functionality and 
intelligence to the system.  The manager directly runs the OpenVAS Scanner using the 
OpenVAS Transfer Protocol (OTP). 
In addition there is the OpenVAS Administrator, which is primarily designed to be a 
command line tool using OpenVAS Administrator Protocol (OAP).  The primary function is 
managing users, such as determining user privileges within the OpenVAS framework.  A user 
must be created along with installing the tool, in order to make managing it possible.  Both the 
manager and administrator connect with the database where preset configurations and old scan 
results are stored.  The OpenVAS scanner, manager and administrator modules are created from 
code within the shared OpenVAS Libraries. 
Integrating OpenVAS into our framework, and therefore into our experimental design, is 
a matter of properly scripting it. In order to do this, a good knowledge of the program is required.  
Little documentation pertaining to CLI automation existed.  We first installed the program on a 
VM in order to test the functionality.  This involved running commands provided on the 
OpenVAS website.  Directing OpenVAS via XML rather than simply the short list of commands 
given by the help and man pages was essential to automating OpenVAS scans. 
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The first step in the script was to handle input parameters.  OpenVAS operates by 
scanning based on IPs that the user provides as input.  Therefore the first parameter to the script 
had to be a target IP to scan.  As mentioned before, OpenVAS also can perform several different 
types of scans.  The second input is an integer parameter representing different types of scans 
each of which has certain tradeoffs.  Certain scans are more thorough, but take longer while 
others operate more quickly and may be more well suited for situations where cloud resources 
are limited or there is a high number of virtual machines.  There is also an optional third 
parameter, which simply activates the verbose functionality, giving more details into what is 
happening when the script is run.  This option may be particularly useful in testing situations, 
given that all of the outputs from the OMP commands are provided to the user for inspection.   
The final option is the help flag to guide the user. 
The script starts by examining the input.  If the script finds any sort of help flag, the help 
function runs and the execution terminates there.  The input IP is parsed in order to determine 
whether or not it is valid.  By splitting the possible range extension off, the function checks that 
each octet is a valid number itself before checking the extension.  Another function checks that 
the scan value also acceptable.  Finally if a third flag is given it is checked to see if it is the 
proper flag to run with verbose output.  If so, extra information is automatically printed 
throughout the script.  
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Figure 4.3.2.2 
 
As seen in the diagram above, the script communicates with three separate other agents.  
First, the script initializes certain variables by confirming with the cloud.  After that, the task is 
created and started via omp and the OpenVAS manager.  After that the script prompts OpenVAS 
for a text report.  Finally the report is parsed and the important results are stored into the 
Reported Information Storage VM.  This problem involves a lot of interaction with the manager 
to work.  One of the main challenges of automating OpenVAS was extracting information from 
the OpenVAS manager.  The script has to consistently keep track of several different IDs in 
order to properly run.  Furthermore, most of this information must be parsed out of the output 
using various string commands in Python.  Then these stored values become input later in the 
script to perform various other functions. 
Our OpenVAS module script was written in Python for two reasons.  Firstly, Python 
offered a very easy way to manipulate strings.  Secondly, our team decided that Python would be 
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the scripting language for all scripts we wrote in order to keep the entire tool easy to understand 
and reduce dependencies.  The script interfaces indirectly with the OpenVAS manager using 
omp via bash.  Since the script relies heavily on running bash commands from Python, we 
developed two different functions for this.  The first function was created to run a single 
command, meaning that the command had to be parsed and executed using the Python 
subprocess module.  Then the output had to be handled correctly in order to prevent deadlocks 
and the result returned.  The second function for bash commands was designed to take two bash 
commands, piping the output of the first as the input to the second.  This was especially helpful 
for using the grep command in order to sort output. 
To initialize before running the primary parts of the script, the script has to actually 
prompt OpenVAS for the configuration ID given the input.  Once that is done, the script can 
begin by creating a target with the given IP argument.  Then a task must be created using the 
target along with the configuration the script already has.  A task is essentially an instance of a 
scan, but it does not run.  When you run the task you create a scan, which creates a unique report 
each time.  One task can produce any number of reports over time.  The script then proceeds to 
run the scan and wait for it to finish.  The script must wait because the report is not fully 
generated until the scan has finished.  Once it has, the script prompts for the report, parses it, and 
outputs the results to the database. 
4.3.3 Reported Information Storage VM 
 
We decided to choose a separate VM specifically to store vulnerability reports that the security 
manager could easily access.  This model allows the security manager to separately access the 
reports without having to run the specific module.  Much like we delegated different roles within 
the framework to each of the other modules, this VM fulfills a very specific functionality within 
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the CVA.  Having a separate VM for the database also allows for it to be persistent, unlike our 
module and target VM’s.  This persistence allows the CVA to maintain a collection of past 
reports and allows the user to examine vulnerability trends.  With a non-persistent database VM, 
all data would be lost every time the VM every time an image was instantiated and shut down. 
 Our Reported Information Storage VM runs a MySQL Version 14.14 Distribution 5.1.61 
for Debian-Linux-gnu (x86_64).  This server runs within Debian 6.0.4, an open source Linux 
distribution.  At this time, both are the latest versions available. 
 We chose MySQL because it is a well-developed database language.  MySQL allows us 
to execute simple queries in order to retrieve data on previous reports.  In addition, it allowed us 
to divide our data within the desired schema.  We initially stored the report information as files 
back to the CVA, but having a separate database offers many advantages, such as: 
(i) organize data by creating tables, specifying their columns and types, 
(ii) very inexpensive and cost effective operations, and 
(iii) joins to easily retrieve specific preexisting data. 
By comparison, files are difficult to manage and often store redundant data.  In addition files are 
difficult to navigate, which adds to the time to assess the reported vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 4.3.3.1 
 
 The figure above, Figure 4.3.3.1, illustrates our database design.  The individual modules 
do not directly interface with the database VM.  Whenever the CVA script runs a module, the 
module produces a results file.  The CVA retrieves this file and parses it in order to extract 
important information.  The CVA inserts this information into the proper tables within the 
database VM.  The CVA script also ensures that the different tables correspond to one another in 
order to make joins easier for the user.  In the ERD model above, a more in depth depiction of 
the database is provided.  All three tables contain a scan_id field, meaning that the results in both 
the sploit and autovas tables can be joined to their respective scans.  The database design consists 
of separate tables for each module, as seen in figure 4.3.3.2.  The database is configured this way 
because the two modules produce different outputs upon completion of their scans.  By having a 
separate scans table, the database becomes modular, by allowing the addition of new tables for 
new tools provided they contain the scan_id attribute. 
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 The tables in the diagram below are built specifically for each module.  The scan table 
contains general information in regards to a single scan.  The attributes contained in the scan 
table are pieces of information, such as the virtual image id, which can be associated with a scan 
run by any module.  The sploit table contains different fields relating to exploit information 
provided by the sploit module.  This module produces information such as, ‘id’, ‘host’, ‘cve’, 
‘osvdb’, ‘bid’, ‘name’, and ‘scan_id’.  Similarly, the autovas table contains the necessary 
attributes to accurately summarize an OpenVAS scan.  It contains ‘id’, ‘scan_id’, ‘nvt’, ‘oid’, 
‘threat’, ‘port’, ‘cve’, and ‘bid’.  The ‘cve’ attribute is a common vulnerability and exposure.  
The ‘nvt’ field stands for network vulnerability tool, while ‘osvdb’ stands for open source 
vulnerability database.  The ‘oid’ and ‘bid’ fields are both standard references to vulnerabilities 
and exploits.  The ‘cve’ field is in both module tables, meaning it is the best way to draw 
comparisons between the two tools.  Both of the module tables use their id field as their primary 
attribute, while the scan table uses the scan_id field. 
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Figure 4.3.3.2 
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4.3.4 Backtrack 
 
“The quieter you are, the more you are able to hear” - Backtrack 
 
As a part of our experimental design, we load the module VM that contains our modules such as 
sploit and autoVAS.  In our methodology, we can easily create these tools based upon existing 
frameworks such as Metasploit and OpenVAS.  Developing this framework has been simplified 
again for us, by choosing the right operating system (OS) to develop and test on.  We now take a 
step even further by introducing the operating system Backtrack [30] which contains all of our 
modules, why we have decided to use this OS, and how it is an ideal penetration testing tool. 
Backtrack is an open source Linux based operating system designed specifically for 
penetration testing funded by Offensive Security [36].  It was developed to be the perfect tool for 
security professionals, and so it contains numerous scripts, penetration testing programs, and 
configurations to simplify offensive security.  Some of the important tools they include in the OS 
are Metasploit and OpenVAS.  In Backtrack 5 R2, both the latest versions of Metasploit and 
OpenVAS are install, and are already preconfigured with the right specifications to quickly get 
up and running.  This has dramatically cut our developed process, because it allowed us to test 
the tools in order to decide which ones we wanted to use and tie it into our framework.  As 
opposed to manually installing each tool, we use a more generic maintained OS, which contains 
the tools.  OpenVAS and Metasploit have documentation provided online, however the level of 
abstraction Backtrack has provided by automatically configuring these tools almost eliminates 
the setup process.  We then simply had to use the tool and examine each tool that we wanted to 
incorporate into our system.  By using Backtrack, it also allows others to easily duplicate our 
work by installing one version of Backtrack, instead of one version of multiple tools. 
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We initially looked at another operating system, Ubuntu Server [33], in hopes of 
developing a lightweight OS that would merely have our tools and their dependencies, but the 
preconfigured tools on Backtrack outweighed this idea.  We consider this as a future work, and 
will later discuss this in our conclusion.  
4.3.5 Other Tools 
 
In addition to OpenVAS and Metasploit, several other tools were considered to be part of the 
CVA.  Specifically two types of tools were considered important.  A virus scanner was one of 
the potential modules, which would augment the vulnerability scanner and exploit tool.  In 
particular, we considered ClamAV [19], an open source antivirus software.  Also, a rootkit 
detector is vital to maintaining security and several were considered.  These tools are of 
particular importance because if a machine is already compromised, then doing vulnerability 
scanning and running exploits is futile.  Given that time did not permit the implementation of 
these modules, this topic will be further discussed in the Further Work section 6.1. 
4.4 Testing Environment 
To test the CVA framework, we have implemented our experimental design directly into the 
cloud front end of SZTAKI’s OpenNebula system.  In the image repository, there are several 
different images with different operating systems; so we scan each public image as an instance 
and report the module feedback.  The systems we tested are detailed in figure 4.4.1.  While 
testing, we complete two types of test, a functional test, and a performance test as our primary 
control. Functional test: we put a vulnerable image into the Image Repository and the tool can 
find all of its known vulnerabilities. Performance test: time cost for the assessment (VM -> avg, 
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min, max; whole Image Repo). Our variable is the modules that are run during both tests.  The 
test sequence is as follows: 
1. Functional test: Sploit Module 
2. Functional test: AutoVAS Module 
3. Functional test: Sploit and AutoVAS Module 
4. Performance test: Sploit Module 
5. Performance test: AutoVAS Module 
6. Performance test: Sploit and AutoVAS Module 
To simulate a real working environment, other instances of images that are run by other users are 
not shut down.  To prevent contamination and duplicating test reports on one image, we have 
removed all running instances of images under the security administrator’s account prior to 
testing. 
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5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 AutoVAS Module 
The AutoVAS module automatically runs OpenVAS on target machines.  For test purposes, we 
ran AutoVAS on all of the available public images.  At the time we ran the test there were 32 
publically available images.  The test took 4:17:02 to scan all 32 of the accessible public images.  
Out of all the scans, the longest lasted 20:51, while the shortest lasted only 54 seconds.  Overall, 
the average scan time was 8:02.  This module found 560 issues and stored them into the 
database.  These issues are classified into four different categories based upon the threat posed 
by the vulnerabilities, high, medium, low, and log.  A majority of the issues found are classified 
as log, accounting for 316 of the stored results.  Log issues are largely unimportant, but 
occasionally do have a CVE or BID numbers describing the issue further in depth.  In addition, 
there were 184 results, which were classified as low, 36 as medium, and 24 as high.  Often, 
medium and high vulnerabilities also had corresponding CVE and BID numbers, which describe 
the issue along with possible fixes.  These are the most important for the security administrator 
to examine and address.  Some scans revealed no results, while one found 94 possible 
vulnerabilities. 
5.2 Sploit Module 
The Sploit module attempts to find exploits in a target machine and open sessions to expose 
weaknesses.  Therefore, this module should return far less results because it is much harder to 
open sessions in remote machines than to find smaller vulnerabilities.  Our test took 2:08:26 to 
complete, with an average scan time of 4:49.  Out of all 32 public images scanned, only one 
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session was opened, via a vulnerability allowing injection of PHP code.  This result is important 
because it becomes much more difficult for an administrator to defend other VM’s within the 
cloud when an attacker uses a hijacked machine as an attack vector. 
5.3 Both Modules 
Running both modules at once allows for comparisons of the data to be made, as well as ensure 
the implementation for running multiple modules is correct.  Two tests were conducted in order 
to assess the functionality and performance, 
1. running the Sploit module followed by the AutoVAS module on each target, and 
2. running AutoVAS followed by Sploit on each target. 
5.3.1 Test 1: Sploit then AutoVAS 
 
This test took a total time of 7:21:13 to complete, with an average of 6:54 per scan.  The Sploit 
module opened 2 sessions, one more than the prior test where it was run without AutoVAS.  The 
AutoVAS module found 719 vulnerability issues, meaning that it was far more effective when 
run in conjunction with the Sploit module.  In particular, the AutoVAS module found more 
results from each of the four classifications, high, medium, low and log.  The AutoVAS scans 
were much more effective in terms of results than during the individual test, but also took more 
time to complete. 
5.3.2 Test 2: AutoVAS then Sploit 
 
The second test took 6:43:04 to run, averaging 6:18 per scan.  As with the first test utilizing both 
modules, the Sploit module found two exploits opening a session with both.  The AutoVAS 
module found a total of 648 vulnerabilities, less than when it was run after Sploit but still more 
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than when run alone.  Similarly to the prior test, the AutoVAS module took more time to 
complete. 
5.4 Results Graphs 
 
Figure 5.4.1 
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Figure 5.4.2 
 
 
Figure 5.4.3 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Cloud Vulnerability Assessment 
We have developed the opensource ‘cvaFrame’ framework as a tool that cloud administrators 
can use to discover vulnerabilities and exploits among their virtual images.  Our intention in 
developing this framework was to prove that such a system can work in the cloud.  Similar to the 
“Mirage” system proposed by the IBM T.J Watson Research team, our framework can be 
managed by an administrator in the cloud and provide protection to both parties.  An advantage 
to the ‘cvaFrame’ framework is that it is more than merely a proposal.  Our opensource project is 
a great starting point for other researchers, users, cloud administrators, and many others to 
protect their cloud system.   Each user has full capabilities in extending this framework, or 
manipulating it towards there needs.  At the time of this research, there were no known tools that 
provided vulnerability assessment in the cloud and could specifically test dormant public images 
in the image repository.  We believe we are the first to investigate cloud vulnerability assessment 
in the cloud and also the first to develop an opensource framework that discovers these 
vulnerabilities and exploits among dormant images. In section 6.2, our future work sections 
details how we can extend this framework even more, which can in turn provide a more robust 
vulnerability assessment report.   
6.2 Further Work 
  
Each topic listed in this section are all key features that can extend the ‘ cvaFrame’ framework.  
These features exist in the future work section due to our 6 week research limitation.  Each 
extension to our framework provides an equal level of contribution to the framework so we do 
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not mention these extensions in any particular order.  We feel that each of these extensions 
should exist in the core of the framework, and other proposed extensions such as the features 
mentioned in the “Mirage” system would exist as plugins to this framework. We highly 
recommend using this framework as a stepping stone towards automating vulnerability image 
assessment in the cloud.   
6.2.1 Automatic Exploit Patches 
Currently our framework is expected to send a report to the security manager assessing the 
cloud; however we believe that our system could be extended to automatically patch 
vulnerabilities and exploits discovered by other modules.  Each module was designed to share 
the same shared storage virtual machine so this module, namely “patch”. It could update dormant 
images based upon information in our database if there are no default update tools on the image, 
or by running the default patch system that exists on the operating.  It would load the image, 
update the machine, and store over the persistent image the updated image so that users who 
accessed the public image would use an updated instance.   
6.2.2 More Modules 
Two specific modules we felt were necessary to include into the ‘cvaFrame’ core are the 
‘rootkit’ and ‘patch’ modules.  The ‘rootkit’ module would detect rootkits that are surreptitiously 
installed on the machine.  We looked at a few available rootkit detectors, namely Sysinternals, 
Tripwire, DumpSec, AIDE, and HijackThis.  Unfortunately the only tool that fits our framework 
is AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment), because it is opensource and works 
natively on all platforms. Sectools claims that AIDE is a free replacement for Tripwire which 
makes cryptographic hashes of important system files and stores them in a database [23]. Based 
57 
 
upon information stored in the database, it can detect rootkits by analyzing changes in those 
important files.  The ‘patch’ module as seen in section 6.2.1 would likewise be a module that 
managed updates. 
6.2.3 Encryption and Key Management 
The csa guide provides several recommendations in regards to encryption and key management 
[20].  The most relevant to this research are,  
(i) alternative approaches to encryption, 
(ii) cryptography in cloud deployments, 
(iii) encryption in cloud databases, 
(iv) key management in the cloud, and 
(v) safe-guarding keys. 
In our framework we use a public key infrastructure (PKI) to allow only the security 
administrator to access the modules, however to secure a data collection, we feel it is necessary 
to explore options available concerning the five noted csa guide suggestions. 
6.2.4 cvaFrame Privledges 
Throughout our experiment, we assume that our framework is run from the security 
administrator viewpoint.  We make this assumption because our framework has potential to 
reveal security issues that can only a security administrator should know.  If this information 
were to be leaked to the wrong user, an entire system can be directly compromised, undermining 
the purpose of this framework.  We therefore propose extending this framework to account for 
roles.  There can be a security administrator role which has full access, and a user role which has 
limited access.  This way, a user may have a limited number of scans allotted to test all of their 
images for vulnerabilities and exploits instead of waiting for the security manager to report to the 
image owner.  
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Appendix 
Example Database Output 
Sploit Table  
 
Scan Table 
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AutoVAS Table 
 
